In addition to the powers granted to county commissions by section six of this article, the county commission of each county may contract with or reimburse any private incorporated society or association, county commission or municipality for the care, maintenance, control or destruction of dogs and cats.
This paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played, and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages. Providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates (revelation) constraints that, combined with signal imperfections, may be a source of inefficiencies. However, by delaying the revelation of their observations, players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations, and thereby avoid these inefficiencies. Because a player would not want to trigger a sanction that would penalize him too, revelation constraints also tend to make sanctions difficult to enforce. However, with at least three players, detecting deviations may not require that all the players reveal their observations. In that case, we obtain a Nash threat version of the Folk theorem. With two players, we do not obtain a similar result. Nevertheless, we show that an efficient outcome can (almost) always be approximated.
Today the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Alicia Bárcena, called for building global governance through alliances between governments, the citizenry and the private sector to promote a change in the development pattern in tune with the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Setting the tone for the meeting, Prof. John Davis, a senior information scientist at RAND and professor of the Pardee RAND Graduate School, discussed the challenges of attribution and the motivations and methods of actors who conduct illegal cyber intrusions. His study Stateless Attribution: Toward International Accountability in Cyberspace proposes an attribution organization independent from the state, similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would be made up of companies from the private sector and civil society. This independent organization would not be concerned with punitive mechanisms, he said, but should focus on synergy of methodology and confidence from the participants to correctly identify actors conducting illegal intrusions.
Laura Rosenberger, who founded the Alliance for Securing Democracy, talked about the challenges for governments when making attribution public, and the role the private sector and civil society can play to galvanize government action and provide public transparency.
Does society benefit from private measures to mitigate infectious disease risks? Since mitigation reduces both peak prevalence and the number of people who fall ill, the answer might appear to be yes. But mitigation also prolongs epidemics and therefore the time susceptible people engage in activities to avoid infection. These avoidance activities come at a cost-in lost production or consumption, for example. Whether private mitigation yields net social benefits depends on the social weight given to the costs of illness and illness avoidance, now and into the future. We show that, for a large class of infectious diseases, private risk mitigation is socially beneficial. However, in cases where society discounts the future at either very low or very high rates relative to private individuals, or where it places a low weight on the private cost of illness, the social cost of illness under proportionate mixing (doing nothing) may be lower than the social cost of illness under preferential mixing (avoiding infectious individuals). That is, under some circumstances, society would prefer shorter, more intense epidemics without avoidance costs over longer, less intense epidemics with avoidance costs. A sobering (although not surprising) implication of this is that poorer societies should be expected to promote less private disease-risk mitigation than richer societies. 041b061a72